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Understanding
Transfers
Community Rights
and the Privatization
of Water
by Joseph L. Sax*

in a recent report, the National Research Council
observed that water markets cannot be expected to resemble
more conventional markets for a variety of reasons. including
the long-held tradition that water resources support a wide
variety of public uses.' Transfers can impose significant thirdparty effects, which must be accounted for in any reallocation.
If transfers are to achieve their potential, the report said, the
decision-making process should bring all relevant third parties
into the deliberations. This broad participation is necessary
because water Is a unique resource, different from other commodities. Markets alone cannot accurately reflect all the relevant values of water. I share these conclusions.
In testifying before the study commission that wrote the
report. I noted the common inclination to think of transfers as
a contract, with two parties only-a buyer and a seller. I believe
that a more appropriate model would be a diplomatic negotiation with a number of parties, each with important and legitimate interests that need to be accommodated, but without
dearly defined rights. The future of water transfers will be jeopardized unless something like that broader and more inclusive
model is embraced.
The question of who has, and who ought to have, what
rights in water raises an issue that has received very little recognition in our legal system: the rights of communities. A companion issue is the limit on privatization of water as a commodity. Unlike almost every other form of property, which we
allow to be entirely privatized, water has always been viewed as
something in which the community has a stake and which no
one can fully own. The complexity of this point is usually
embraced in the phrase -third-party effects' when talking about
water transfers.
Although third-party effects exist wherever significant
resources are allocated or reallocated, they are usually ignored.
Years ago. when O'Hare Airport in Chicago was opened, Midway
Airport-at that time the busiest airport in the world-was
entirely closed down. Many of the businesses located around
the airport, and dependent on it. went broke. When a theater
next to a restaurant Is sold and turned into a warehouse, the
restaurant may go out of business. When General Motors doses a factory in Michigan and opens one in another state or
another country, workers may be left in a lurch. These are all
third-party effect problems. With rare exceptions, they have no
standing in our legal system. But water is and always has been
different--certainly in theory, and to some extent in practice.
Reallocations of resources, such as a factory relocation.
usually generate a variety of costs to the export community.
such as increased welfare payments, more unemployment compensation and fewer public services as tax revenues decline. At
worst, reallocations result in the creation of a permanently
depressed Appalachian-type community. However, positive
effects also occur. A new community may prosper, products
may be produced more efficiently, and obsolete industries
phased out.
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Legal History of the Issue
Concerns about the de-watering of the Owens Valley
by Los Angeles gave rise to the area of origin law in
California legislation stating that people in the area
where water arises have first claim to it.2 This is not
solely a California phenomenon; the same issue has
arisen elsewhere in the West. It has been played out
between the western slope of the Rockies in Colorado
and the more populous and urbanized eastern slope;
the western slope people have had their rights recog3
nized as water was removed from the area of origin.
The same is true in the Great Lakes area, where states
and Canadian provinces bordering the lakes have
fought and won, through Federal law, the right to keep
other states from drawing on the water there. 4 The
intense sense of loss was not diminished by the fact
that in the Great Lakes region, water is measured not
in acre-feet but in cubic miles.
Sometimes, the state itself asserts a right in
water. Many years ago, a New Jersey company diverted
water from the Passaic River in order to transport it to
New York and sell it there. The State of New Jersey prohibited the exports, and the U.S. Supreme Court sustained the state by rejecting the property claims of the
putative exporter.5 The Supreme Court described water
as something that could not be fully privatized, something in which there was a residual and inalienable
interest in the community of origin. In effect, the Court
stated that water was a heritage resource, which the
community could control and keep for itself. This may
be the earliest example of court action holding that
ordinary contract principles were not sufficient to govern water marketing. The Supreme Court more recently recognized a similar public right in groundwater. In
that case, the State of Nebraska wanted to prevent
water from being pumped there and exported to
Colorado. The court recognized that-at least where
there was a demonstrable need for the water in the
area of origin-the state could override property
6
claims, or claims that water was simply a commodity.
The situation involving water is very unusual, and
it applies to virtually nothing else. For purposes of
interstate commerce, for example, all other state
resources may be privatized fully, and freely shipped
away from the area of origin as ordinary commodities-even though states have often tried to keep such
resources within their own boundaries to benefit their
own residents. Such efforts have routinely and repeatedly been held unconstitutional by the courts. 7 The
2. E g., CAL
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Thus, to treat water purely as a commodity, and transfers as two-party transactions only, is to depart from a
very deeply rooted tradition in the water field and from
consistent intuitions about water as a community
resource. But community right is such an unusual Idea
in our law that, despite its history and despite Its
strong intuitive power, we have little experience in giving it content. For example, we may say that in general an owner may not sell more water than his or her
consumptive use; but we have no theory about
whether even that should be salable. We have virtually no legal doctrine to describe the relation between
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only other common example where things are treated
like water-that is, as community resources and not as
ordinary salable commodities-arises with cultural
properties, antiquities for example, where the nation
of origin often asserts a national claim on the property in order to prevent exports.8
Community claims on water do not arise solely In
the context of interstate commerce. They are also
found in state law. The area of origin protection that
California and other states employ in a variety of forms
already has been mentioned. California has a law that
limits rights to transfer if there are unreasonable
impacts on the local economy or on natural
resources. 9 Some states have an even broader test of
compatibility, with the public welfare as a condition of
transfer, or requiring consideration of economic loss
to the community, although the content of these socalled "public interest statutes" has been given very little interpretation.
As is well-known, California has applied the public trust doctrine in the Mono Lake case to limit the
removal of water from its natural setting. 10 Of course,
the traditional theory of riparian law was that water
must be kept for use on land riparian to its native
stream and within its watershed. At least in theory,
this is still the law in California.
In addition, there is a tradition, both in some
Western states and also under the original federal
reclamation program, to keep water appurtenant to
the land on which it was first used-that is, to keep it
within the community as a community resource,"
Appurtenance is a very strong tradition in other cultures, such as Hispanic water law, where community Is
12
valued far more than efficiency.
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an owner who wants to sell water and the community
from which that water will be exported.
Nor is there any clear concept of a -community"
entitled to protection against the effects of export
transfers. There are all kinds of different communities
whose claims could lead, depending on how the community is described, to very different sorts of limitations on water transfers.
If the state is the relevant community, then a
review of transfers by a state agency might be seen as
fulfilling the.community claim. But if the community Is
the local economy, then the state may not-and to
some extent almost certainly will not-fully reflect
that community's interests. Another relevant community may be the water institution, the water district, for
example, which certainly has interests of its own. Ifthe
district is the relevant community, it may not fully
overlap the local economy that may be affected by a
sale of water. There also are the so-called -natural
communities" or "in-stream value communities'.
Because of strong desires to facilitate transfers.
efforts have been primarily directed toward empowering individual sellers as against community claims in
order to promote transfers. Almost all recent legislation dealing with transfers looks in this direction. This
is understandable. If enough interests are involved
and each has something like a veto power, transfers
will be so weighted down that the whole enterprise is
likely to collapse under its own bureaucratic weight
and increased transactional costs.
Redistribution of Wealth
My observations are based on two premises: (I) that
the claim for a community stake in water is legitimate
and is reflected in a wide range of responses to water
problems over a very long time; and (2) that legitimate
community claims have been neglected in the effort to
facilitate water transfers.
First, water in place is a type of wealth. That
wealth accrues not only to the owner of a water right.
but to many other people in the place where the water
is located-in the form of employment, direct and
indirect- in lower prices for water because of its relative
abundance- and in natural values, such as recreation
and fisheries, that arise as a result of water's presence.
Second, when water is sold as a mere commodity.
only the formal owner of a water right is compensated.
For that individual, there is a transformation of wealth
from one form to another-from water to cash. Indeed
the seller is likely to be significantly enriched, particularly in agricultural-to-urban transfers, since water has
usually been under-priced. Payments for water frequently exceed the profits that sellers could have
obtained from using the water for irrigation.
Third, while such sales are, for the owner-sellers,
transformational-wealth is transformed from water to
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cash-for everyone else who has been benefiting from
the presence of that water, the sales are redistributional. That is. others In the community who have up
to that point benefited from wealth in the form of
water in place will be made worse off, since the water
Isgone and they receive nothing in return. Moreover, it
is likely that the redistribution will be especially
adverse to (1) people who have salaried jobs that
depend on the presence of the water and are likely to
be the first to lose work if economic activity is reduced.
and (2) poorer Ieople in the communities, since they
are often the least mobile residents; they are unlikely
to move and find equivalent work and amenities elsewhere.
It may be true that aggregate losses resulting from
agricultural-to-urban water transfers are relatively
small because agricultural employment is a small percentage of total state employment, and because the
economic contribution of the low value crops that are
the most likely to decline is small. Nonetheless, to
those in the community who are the losers, the losses
are likely to be very significant.
All this suggests to me the existence of a first
order conflict between user-sellers---that is owners of
water rights who have been in a position to reap the
benefits of a sale-and other interests, natural, economic and social, who have hitherto been enriched by
the presence of water and will obtain no benefit from
its sale. The relevant community is composed of those
who would be made poorer by the sale of a particular
amount of water.
To avoid wealth redistribution in transfers, the following precepts would apply: first, transfers should not
be redistributive to the disadvantage of those in the
selling area, both in human and natural terms. Second.
the price of the water to those acquiring it should take
into account all the benefits the water has produced,
not lust those that have flowed to the holders of formal water rights.
Approaches to Mitigation
There are several practical ways to promote such goals.
One is to favor sales that minimize disadvantages to
the community. The most obvious are those that free
up water by applying water-saving techniques, so that
the same amount of economic activity continues in the
selling community.
Another device is the provision of community
compensation through a transfer tax. Where sales generate a general decline in the wealth of the community, the concern ought to be for those who remainthose who are least able to leave, rather than for those
who can shift and leave the community. Transfer taxes
benefit those who remain in the community. A tax on
water sales, depending on the nature of the sale and
its redistributive impact, would be the easiest means

Joseph L Sax
to mitigate the redistributive tendency of export sales.
A similar approach could be taken to mitigate natural
losses-losses to waterfowl habitat for example.
It is true that much of the water likely to be sold
does not come from the original place of origin, but
rather from a place to which water has been imported.
That fact should not affect the conclusion as long as a
community has been established-whether it is a
human settlement or a natural habitat, such as a
wildlife refuge. Once such uses are established, the
removal of water constitutes a disruption in that community, even if the community is only a few decades
old, and thus also constitutes wealth redistribution.
The more one enlarges the interests that need to
be accounted for, and the more complex or extensive
the arrangements to evaluate transfers become, the
more transfers will be discouraged. This is a serious
problem, but there are ways around it. The best way to
deal with this issue is to adopt generally applicable
formulae that are meant to approximate the losses to
the community caused by various types and sizes of
transfers. Formulae for taxes on transfers, compensation to in-stream uses, and prioritization of favored
and disfavored types of transfers can be employed to
assure mitigation without making transactional costs
unduly burdensome. Large and pervasive impacts can
be treated differently from small and ephemeral ones;
and different standards can be imposed for in-basin
and out-of-basin transfers.
Reducing all these concerns to some kind of workable formulae can promote transfers by reducing transaction costs while taking account of the most important third-party effects: reductions in existing wealth.
Of course, a formulaic approach is a second-best solution, and will not produce the appropriate result in
every individual case. But the alternative-extensive
participation and elaborate public interest hearingswhile theoretically appropriate, threatens to make all
but the largest water transfers uneconomic and
untimely. Certainly some review process is necessary,
but the goal should be to make it largely a fall-back
device for especially hard cases. For the most part,
some sort of formulaic approach will have to be adopted, or the whole system is likely to sink from its own
weight.
Most discussion of water transfers has been
focused on what are seen as obstacles-legal, institutional and psychological. In my view, we need to
encourage some transfers, but not by commodity theories that lead to reverse wealth redistribution. The
solution to inadequate water transfers in California is
not to ignore community interests in water, but to
institutionalize them as part of the price of water,
rather than letting all the benefits flow to the formal
owners of water use rights and to the buyers of the
water.
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